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UK: The Retail Cyberattack Wave — M&S, Co-op & Jaguar Land Rover

In the spring and summer of 2025, three of Britain's best-known companies were hit in quick succession: Marks & Spencer, the Co-op and Jaguar Land Rover. The attacks shared a method — attackers impersonating employees to talk a help desk into resetting a password — and they shared a consequence: weeks of disruption, hundreds of millions of pounds in costs, and millions of customers' personal data stolen. Together they are the biggest retail cyber incident in British history, and the reason the UK Parliament took evidence from the companies' chairmen. This page covers all three, with each company's figures kept separate.

In short

Attribution: Reported / linked by researchers and media to Scattered Spider / UNC3944 using DragonForce ransomware (M&S and Co-op); JLR attribution unresolved — a Telegram claim by 'Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters' is not regarded by investigators as the actual perpetrator. Marks & Spencer: initial entry 17 April 2025, detected 19 April (Easter Saturday), public 22 April; DragonForce ransomware deployed 24 April 2025 against VMware ESXi hosts; online clothing orders paused about 6-7 weeks; £131.3 million in cyber-related costs in the financial year to 28 March 2026; customer contact details, dates of birth and order histories stolen. Co-op: attacked 25 April 2025, disclosed 30 April; ransomware deployment prevented, but personal data of all 6.5 million members stolen; first-half revenue hit £206 million, full-year profit hit estimated at £120 million. Jaguar Land Rover: attacked 31 August 2025, systems shut 1 September, disclosed 2 September; production halted about 5 weeks; £196 million direct costs in the July-September quarter; UK government £1.5 billion loan guarantee announced 29 September 2025; estimated UK economic cost about £1.9 billion.

Marks & Spencer: the help-desk trick

Attribution: Linked by researchers / media to Scattered Spider / UNC3944 using DragonForce ransomware; the National Crime Agency did NOT name a group. The attack began with initial entry on 17 April 2025, according to chairman Archie Norman's evidence to Parliament on 8 July 2025. It was detected on 19 April 2025, Easter Saturday, and made public on 22 April. The method was social engineering, not a technical break-in: attackers impersonated an employee and tricked a third-party contractor into resetting a password. With that credential, they reached the network, and on 24 April 2025 DragonForce ransomware was deployed against VMware ESXi hosts, encrypting the virtual machines that supported e-commerce, payments and logistics.

The impact was immediate and visible. Online clothing orders were suspended on 25 April 2025 for about 6-7 weeks. Click-and-collect and gift cards were suspended. Shelves were bare in places as logistics faltered. Customer contact details, dates of birth and online order histories were stolen. The financial cost was £131.3 million in cyber-related costs in the financial year to 28 March 2026, with a statutory profit impact of about £300 million warned at the time, and a £100 million insurance recovery reported. Four people aged 17-20 were arrested by the National Crime Agency on 10 July 2025 on suspicion of Computer Misuse Act and blackmail offences; as of September 2026 no public record of charges for the M&S attack had been found in the sources checked.

Co-op: the attack that was stopped — too late

Attribution: Attributed in media to Scattered Spider / DragonForce; Co-op / Parliament evidence did not name a group in the sources checked. The Co-op was attacked on 25 April 2025 — eight days after the M&S entry — and disclosed the attack on 30 April 2025. The method was the same help-desk social-engineering pattern as M&S, according to the Co-op's evidence to Parliament. But the Co-op's response was different: it detected the attack within hours, shut systems down, and PREVENTED the ransomware from being deployed. On that measure, the Co-op won. On the measure that mattered to its members, it lost anyway — because the attackers had already copied the data before the shutdown.

The personal data of all 6.5 million Co-op members was stolen: names, addresses, contact details and dates of birth. No financial information was reported stolen. Back-office and call-centre systems were shut, food availability in stores was hit, and systems were restored about 14 days after the attack. The financial cost was a first-half revenue hit of £206 million and a full-year profit hit estimated at £120 million (Reuters, 25 September 2025). The Co-op's experience is the clearest lesson in this hub about the limits of incident response: stopping the ransomware is not the same as stopping the breach, because data theft happens before encryption, and a fast shutdown cannot un-copy data.

Jaguar Land Rover: five weeks without a car

Attribution: Unresolved / contested — see below. The Jaguar Land Rover attack began on 31 August 2025. Systems were shut down on 1 September 2025 and the incident was disclosed on 2 September. JLR proactively shut down almost all of its IT systems globally — a decision that stopped production, but stopped it on JLR's terms rather than the attackers'. Production was halted for about 5 weeks, with a phased restart from 8 October 2025 and production back to normal in mid-November 2025. Plants at Solihull, Halewood and Wolverhampton were affected, and sites in Slovakia, China and India were also paused.

No public evidence showed that attackers reached factory PLCs or operational technology — production stopped because factories could not run without IT, not because the production line itself was hacked. That distinction matters: JLR was an IT attack with OT consequences. The costs were £196 million in direct cyber-related costs in the July-September quarter, and the UK government announced a £1.5 billion loan guarantee on 29 September 2025. The Cyber Monitoring Centre classified it as a Category 3 systemic event, with an estimated UK economic cost of about £1.9 billion (range £1.6-2.1 billion), affecting more than 5,000 UK organisations — suppliers, dealers and logistics firms that depended on JLR.

Who did it — and the JLR puzzle

Attribution: M&S and Co-op — reported / linked to Scattered Spider / UNC3944 with DragonForce; JLR — unresolved. The M&S and Co-op attacks were linked by researchers and media to Scattered Spider (UNC3944), a group known for social-engineering help desks, using DragonForce ransomware. Neither the NCA nor the companies named a group in the sources checked, so the link is reported, not official. The JLR case is more complicated. A group calling itself 'Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters' claimed responsibility on Telegram. Investigators do NOT regard that group as the actual perpetrator: a New York Times investigation reported in June 2026, as summarised in secondary reporting, pointed to Russian hackers instead. The Telegram claim and the investigation point in different directions, and the attribution is treated here as unresolved and contested.

The shared method across all three attacks is more certain than the shared actor. All three involved social engineering against people — help-desk impersonation at M&S and the Co-op — rather than exploitation of a software vulnerability. That is why the Parliamentary evidence mattered: the companies' chairmen described, on the record, how a phone call to a contractor could bring down a national retailer. The defence is not only technical. It is training, verification procedures for password resets, and multi-factor authentication that cannot be talked away by a convincing voice on the phone.

What the three attacks cost — and who paid

The figures must be kept separate, because each company counted differently. Marks & Spencer: £131.3 million in cyber-related costs in the year to 28 March 2026, a warned profit impact of about £300 million, and a £100 million insurance recovery. Co-op: £206 million first-half revenue hit and an estimated £120 million full-year profit hit. Jaguar Land Rover: £196 million direct costs in one quarter, a £1.5 billion government loan guarantee, and an estimated £1.9 billion cost to the UK economy through more than 5,000 affected organisations. Adding those figures together would be misleading — they cover different periods, different definitions of cost, and in JLR's case a national economic estimate rather than a company loss.

Who paid is also different in each case. M&S shareholders absorbed the cost, partly offset by insurance. Co-op members paid in stolen data and disrupted shopping, and the Co-op paid in lost revenue. JLR's suppliers and dealers — more than 5,000 organisations — paid in lost orders and idle capacity, which is why the government stepped in with a loan guarantee. The systemic point is the one the Cyber Monitoring Centre made: a cyberattack on one large company is an attack on its whole supply chain, and the economic damage spreads far beyond the victim's own accounts.

Why this wave belongs in a preparedness hub

The UK retail wave is not about food or power, and it did not threaten anyone's heating or drinking water. It belongs here for a different reason: it showed how a single weak process — a password reset by phone — could take down companies that millions of people depend on every day. M&S online orders stopped for six weeks. Co-op food availability was hit. JLR made no cars for five weeks. If the same method had been used against a supermarket distribution system or a water utility's help desk, the consequences would have been measured in empty shelves and disrupted services rather than lost car sales.

The wave also explains why the Netherlands' Phase Black planning and the UK's own Be Ready campaign both emphasise the human side of resilience. Technology fails, but so do processes, and the M&S attack succeeded because a person was persuaded, not because a firewall was breached. Preparedness is not only generators and stockpiles. It is also verification procedures, staff training, and the discipline to treat an urgent phone call asking for a password reset as a security event, not a favour.

Frequently asked questions

By social engineering: attackers impersonated an employee and tricked a third-party contractor into resetting a password. DragonForce ransomware was then deployed on 24 April 2025 against VMware ESXi hosts.

About 6-7 weeks, from 25 April 2025. Click-and-collect and gift cards were also suspended, and shelves were bare in places.

Personal data of all 6.5 million members: names, addresses, contact details and dates of birth. No financial information was reported stolen. The Co-op prevented ransomware deployment but could not prevent the data theft.

About 5 weeks. The attack was on 31 August 2025, systems were shut on 1 September, phased restart began 8 October 2025, and production was back to normal in mid-November 2025.

Unresolved. A group calling itself 'Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters' claimed it on Telegram, but investigators do not regard that group as the actual perpetrator, and a New York Times investigation pointed to Russian hackers. The attribution is contested.

M&S: £131.3 million in cyber-related costs. Co-op: £206 million first-half revenue hit and an estimated £120 million full-year profit hit. JLR: £196 million direct costs in one quarter, with an estimated £1.9 billion cost to the UK economy.

M&S and Co-op were linked by researchers and media to Scattered Spider / DragonForce and shared the same help-desk method eight days apart. JLR's attribution is unresolved and is not presented here as part of the same campaign.

Sources & check time. UK Parliament, Business & Trade Committee oral evidence (8 Jul 2025); TechCrunch (16 Jul 2025); Reuters (25 Sep 2025); 1Kosmos timeline (Parliament evidence, NCA arrests, FY results); BlackFog (M&S); Blacknote Intelligence (25 Oct 2026, JLR); Aspenfy (3 Nov 2026, JLR); Cyber Monitoring Centre Category 3 assessment. Last checked Tue 17 Nov 2026.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.