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NOT a Cyberattack: The FAA Ground Stop & the Iberian Blackout

Two of the most disruptive infrastructure failures of recent years are routinely described as cyberattacks. Neither was one. The FAA nationwide ground stop of Friday 13 November 2026 was caused by a router flooding a communications network during upgrade work. The Iberian blackout of Monday 28 April 2025 was caused by a voltage collapse and cascading generator disconnections. In both cases, the authorities investigated, found no evidence of a cyberattack, and said so publicly. This page gives the evidence for both, explains why people confuse them with cyberattacks, and states the one honest caveat: in the FAA case, the 'not cyber' judgement came before the root cause was determined, and it is provisional until the investigation finishes.

In short

Attribution: NOT APPLICABLE — neither event was a cyberattack. FAA ground stop: on Friday 13 November 2026, instability began at about 15:36 Eastern Time; a nationwide ground stop was issued at about 15:45-15:54 ET and lifted at 20:15 ET — 4 hours 21 minutes, the longest nationwide ground stop since 11 September 2001. A router at a remote FAA communications facility (reported as El Dorado, Arkansas; a second site in Amarillo, Texas, was also mentioned) being replaced during copper-to-fibre work by contractor L3Harris started flooding other routers — more than 1,000 connection attempts every 4-5 seconds (about 200-250 per second) — destabilising communications and radar feeds at 17 of 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. About 12,000-12,462 flights were cancelled. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford ('zero evidence of anything nefarious or AI-related') and Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin all said there was no indication of a cyberattack. Iberian blackout: on Monday 28 April 2025 at 12:32-12:33 Central European Summer Time, Spain lost 25,638 MW of demand and Portugal 5,900 MW in a total blackout, the most severe in Europe in more than 20 years. The Spanish government report of 17 June 2025 found NO evidence of a cyberattack; the cause was a multifactorial failure — insufficient voltage / reactive-power control, overvoltage and cascading generator disconnections. ENTSO-E's expert panel (factual report October 2025, final report 20 March 2026, 472 pages) reached the same conclusion.

The FAA ground stop: what actually happened

Attribution: NOT a cyberattack — official position as of 14-16 Nov 2026. On Friday 13 November 2026, the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control communications began to fail. Instability was reported from about 15:36 Eastern Time. At about 15:45-15:54 ET the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop — every departing flight in the United States held on the ground — and at 20:15 ET it was lifted. The stop lasted 4 hours 21 minutes, the longest nationwide ground stop since 11 September 2001 and only the third in US history (the others were 11 September 2001 and the NOTAM failure of January 2023). About 12,000-12,462 flights were cancelled, including about 3,000 private and general aviation flights, and about 9,082 by major airlines according to the FAA. Another roughly 8,000 planned flights were 'recovered' after the stop lifted, and airlines expected full schedules by the end of Sunday 15 November.

The cause, according to the FAA's preliminary account, was a router at a remote communications facility — reported as El Dorado, Arkansas, with a second site in Amarillo, Texas, also mentioned in the FAA's questions-and-answers document — being replaced during copper-to-fibre work by contractor L3Harris, which has managed the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) since 2002. When the new router was switched on, it started flooding other routers with more than 1,000 connection attempts every 4-5 seconds, destabilising communications and radar feeds at 17 of the FAA's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. About 3,500 aircraft already in the air landed safely. The FAA also said its new AI tool SMART, rolled out to all 22 centres on 10 November, did NOT cause the stop.

What the officials said — and the caveat

Attribution: NOT a cyberattack, per the officials below — with the caveat that the judgement is provisional. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said at a briefing on 14 November 2026 that the stop was caused by a router malfunction during sustainment work, with the root cause under investigation — contractor error versus faulty equipment versus misconfiguration or installation. FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said there was 'zero evidence of anything nefarious or AI-related' and 'we don't believe this was cyber at all'. Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said there was no indication of a cyberattack. The FAA said there was no indication of a cyberattack or an outside nefarious actor. The FBI does not believe a cyberattack or criminal activity was involved, according to Bloomberg reporting, although the FBI is partnering on the router review.

The caveat must be stated honestly. The 'not cyber' judgement came within about a day of the event, before the root cause was determined. BankInfoSecurity noted that the official account shifted within about 20 hours, and that 'not cyber is a provisional judgment'. The root-cause analysis was still ongoing as of 14-16 November 2026. This page therefore presents the official position as of 14-16 November 2026 — no indication of a cyberattack — and does not present it as a final forensic conclusion. If the investigation's final report changes the picture, this page will be updated and the change dated. What can be said now is that the mechanism described by the FAA — a router flooding a network during upgrade work — is a known failure mode of network upgrades, and no evidence of malicious activity has been presented by any authority.

The Iberian blackout: a voltage collapse, not a hack

Attribution: NOT a cyberattack — Spanish government report 17 June 2025; ENTSO-E expert panel, October 2025 and 20 March 2026. On Monday 28 April 2025 at 12:32-12:33 Central European Summer Time, the Iberian Peninsula went dark. Spain lost 25,638 MW of demand; Portugal lost 5,900 MW. It was a total blackout, the most severe in Europe in more than 20 years. Portugal's power was restored by about 00:22 the next day; Spain's by about 04:00. The cause was not a cyberattack. The Spanish government report of 17 June 2025 found NO evidence of a cyberattack. Its conclusion was a multifactorial failure: insufficient voltage and reactive-power control, overvoltage, and cascading generator disconnections — a chain of electrical and control failures that fed on each other until the system collapsed.

ENTSO-E, the European network of transmission system operators, published an expert panel factual report in October 2025 and a final report on 20 March 2026 (472 pages). Its conclusion was the same: a combination of many interacting factors, including oscillations, voltage-control gaps and protection settings that diverged from requirements. No cyber cause was found. The blackout was a failure of the power system's own controls and protections, under conditions the system was not set up to handle — not an attack on it. That distinction is the whole point of this page: a catastrophic infrastructure failure and a cyberattack are different things, and the Iberian blackout is the proof.

Why people think they were cyberattacks

Both events were immediately described online as cyberattacks, and the reasons are understandable. They were sudden, nationwide, and unexplained in the first hours. They hit critical infrastructure — aviation and electricity — that the public knows is a target for hackers. They happened in a year full of real cyberattacks, including the supermarket-refrigeration waves and the Ahold Delhaize incident, so a cyber explanation felt plausible. And in the FAA case, officials had not initially ruled out a cyberattack on Friday evening; the position hardened only as the investigation pointed to the router work. A reader who saw the first hours of coverage and not the later briefings could reasonably be left with the impression of an attack.

Social media made the confusion worse. Claims circulated that the FAA stop, the Iberian blackout and the European fridge incidents were one coordinated campaign. There is NO evidence in authoritative sources for a single campaign. The only official cross-border link established in public evidence is the French October fridge attribution to Shahid Kaveh. The FAA stop has a documented router cause, the Iberian blackout has a documented voltage-collapse cause, and the fridge attacks have their own separate attributions — or none. Treating them as one campaign is not a theory supported by evidence. It is a pattern imposed on unrelated events because they happened in the same season.

How to tell a cyberattack from a technical failure

The difference is evidence, not scale. A cyberattack leaves forensic traces: malicious code, unauthorised access, command-and-control infrastructure, stolen data, a ransom note, a claim of responsibility. A technical failure leaves a different kind: a faulty component, a configuration error, a protection setting, an oscillation. In the FAA case, the trace was a router flooding a network with connection attempts — a failure mode that network engineers recognise. In the Iberian case, the traces were voltage readings, protection relay settings and generator trip logs — electrical evidence, not digital intrusion evidence. In both cases, the investigating authorities looked for cyber evidence and did not find it, and said so.

The test for readers is simple: who says it was a cyberattack, and on what evidence? An official statement based on a forensic investigation is evidence. A social-media post noting that two bad things happened in the same month is not. A claim by a group with no non-public detail is not. And the absence of an immediate explanation is not evidence of an attack — it is evidence that an investigation takes time. The FAA and Iberian cases both show the same sequence: confusion first, investigation second, a technical explanation third. The sequence is normal. What is not normal is to keep calling an event a cyberattack after the investigation has reported and found none.

What this means for preparedness

The fact that these two events were NOT cyberattacks does not make them less relevant to preparedness — it makes them more relevant. The Netherlands' Phase Black planning is built around supermarkets that keep running when digital systems fail. The failure that takes the systems down can be a cyberattack, a router fault, a voltage collapse or a storm. The emergency supermarket does not care which one it was. The same is true of the 72-hour emergency kit, the NL-Alert system and the other preparedness measures in this site's preparedness hub: they are designed for the consequence — no power, no food, no communications — not for the cause.

That is also why this page exists in a cyberattacks hub. If readers believe every infrastructure failure is a cyberattack, they will demand cyber defences for problems that need electrical engineering, network maintenance and physical resilience. If they believe no failure is ever a cyberattack, they will ignore the real attacks documented elsewhere in this hub. The correct position is the one the evidence supports in each case: the fridge waves, the Poland wiper and the water-system campaign were cyberattacks; the FAA stop and the Iberian blackout were not. Preparedness has to cover both.

Frequently asked questions

No evidence indicates so. The FAA, the FAA Administrator ('zero evidence of anything nefarious'), the Transportation Secretary and the Homeland Security Secretary all said there was no indication of a cyberattack. The cause was a router flooding the FAA communications network during copper-to-fibre upgrade work.

4 hours 21 minutes — from about 15:45-15:54 ET to 20:15 ET on Friday 13 November 2026. It was the longest nationwide ground stop since 11 September 2001.

No. It is the official position as of 14-16 November 2026, given before the root cause was determined. BankInfoSecurity noted the official account shifted within about 20 hours and called 'not cyber' a provisional judgement. The root-cause analysis was still ongoing.

No. The Spanish government report of 17 June 2025 found no evidence of a cyberattack, and ENTSO-E's expert panel (October 2025, final report 20 March 2026) reached the same conclusion. The cause was a voltage collapse and cascading generator disconnections.

Monday 28 April 2025 at 12:32-12:33 Central European Summer Time. Spain lost 25,638 MW of demand and Portugal 5,900 MW. Power was restored by about 00:22 (Portugal) and 04:00 (Spain) the next day.

No evidence in authoritative sources supports a single campaign. The only official cross-border link established is the French October fridge attribution to Shahid Kaveh. The three events have separate, documented causes.

By the evidence: cyberattacks leave forensic traces such as malware, unauthorised access or a ransom note; technical failures leave traces such as a faulty component or a protection setting. In both cases here, investigators looked for cyber evidence, did not find it, and said so.

Sources & check time. Aviation Week (14 Nov 2026, updated 16 Nov 2026); BankInfoSecurity (15 Nov 2026); FAA Nationwide Ground Stop Questions and Answers (15 Nov 2026); ENTSO-E 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout hub (expert panel factual report Oct 2025, final report 20 Mar 2026); Spanish government report (17 Jun 2025). Last checked Tue 17 Nov 2026.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.