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France: The Supermarket Fridge Hack of October 2026

On the night of 11-12 October 2026, while the shops were closed, attackers reached into the refrigeration controllers of supermarkets across France and forced freezers and chillers into defrost mode. Temperatures climbed to 50 degrees Celsius. Food spoiled by the tonne, fires broke out in at least 15 stores, and shelves had to be cleared. A month later, on 9 November 2026, France formally blamed an Iranian cyber unit. This is the full verified account: what happened, how it was done, how many stores were hit, and what the attribution does and does not prove.

In short

Attribution: Official — Shahid Kaveh, an offensive cyber unit inside the IRGC's Electronic and Cyber Centre, attributed by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot on 9 November 2026 at the Paris G7, based on an ANSSI / CERT-FR report. On the night of 11-12 October 2026 (overnight, Central European Time), attackers remotely forced refrigeration and freezer units in French supermarkets into defrost mode, pushing temperatures to up to 50 degrees Celsius. The French government put the count at around 700 of about 10,000 French supermarkets; BleepingComputer estimated 250-350, a difference of definition and counting that is explained below. Chains named include Intermarche / Netto with more than 300 stores, Carrefour with about 80, Cooperative U with about 80 and Monoprix with about 30, plus E.Leclerc and others. The equipment was Danfoss AK-SM / AK-SC controllers and Copeland / Dixell XWEB units, many of them internet-reachable, some with default credentials. This attribution applies to the October France attack only — not to the November wave and not to other countries.

What happened on the night of 11-12 October 2026

Attribution: Official — Shahid Kaveh (IRGC), attributed 9 November 2026 by Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot. The attack ran overnight on 11-12 October 2026, while stores were closed, in Central European Time. Attackers reached refrigeration controllers remotely and forced units into defrost mode — the cycle that normally melts frost off evaporator coils for a few minutes — and held them there. With cooling off and heating elements running, temperatures inside freezers and chillers rose to up to 50 degrees Celsius (122 Fahrenheit). Frozen and chilled food spoiled and had to be thrown away. In at least 15 cases, fires started, according to ANSSI as reported in secondary coverage. Staff arriving in the morning found warm cabinets, spoiled stock and, in the worst cases, fire damage.

CERT-FR, the French national cyber incident response team, issued alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 on 12 October 2026, updating it on 13 and 16 October. The alert named the equipment families involved and gave mitigation guidance to operators of similar controllers. The timing matters: the alert went out the same day the damage was discovered, which is why the October wave is the best-documented incident in this hub. The chains named in reporting were Intermarche / Netto with more than 300 stores affected, Carrefour with about 80, Cooperative U with about 80, Monoprix with about 30, and E.Leclerc among others.

How the fridges were turned against the stores

The controllers at the centre of the attack were Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC series units and Copeland / Dixell XWEB units — the industrial controllers that manage temperature, defrost cycles and alarms across a supermarket's refrigeration plant. Many of them were internet-reachable, and some were protected only by default credentials, reported as 'admin' with the current date as the password. That is not a sophisticated break-in. It is the operational-technology equivalent of leaving a door unlocked: equipment designed to be managed remotely, connected to the internet, and never given a proper password.

Two vulnerabilities in the Danfoss AK-SM 800A were part of the discussion: CVE-2025-41450, an authentication bypass rated CVSS 8.2, and CVE-2025-41451, a command injection rated CVSS 8.7, both disclosed in 2025 by Claroty Team82 and CISA. They were identified in the equipment involved, but no source checked formally tied a specific CVE as the exploited entry point for the October wave, and this page does not do so either. The honest summary is that the attackers had more than one plausible way in — exposed controllers, weak credentials and known vulnerabilities — and the public record does not settle which one they used. What is settled is the method: remote commands that switched cooling off and defrost on, at scale, overnight.

How many stores: 700 or 250-350?

The two counts that circulate are both sourced, and they measure different things. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot and Finance Minister Roland Lescure put the figure at around 700 stores out of about 10,000 supermarkets in France. BleepingComputer's estimate was 250-350. The gap is a difference of definition: targeted versus successfully compromised, stores where a controller was reached versus stores where food was actually spoiled, and the point in time at which the count was taken. Neither figure is wrong on its own terms; presenting either one without the other would mislead readers.

This page therefore reports the range with its sources: around 700 by the French government's count, 250-350 by BleepingComputer's estimate. The same discipline applies to the chain-level figures, which are reported as named in the sources: more than 300 Intermarche / Netto stores, about 80 Carrefour, about 80 Cooperative U and about 30 Monoprix. Whatever the exact total, the scale is not in doubt: hundreds of stores across multiple chains, hit in a single night, by the same method.

The attribution: Shahid Kaveh and the IRGC

On 9 November 2026, at the Paris G7 meeting, Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot formally attributed the October attack to Shahid Kaveh, an offensive cyber unit inside the Electronic and Cyber Centre of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The attribution rested on an ANSSI / CERT-FR report, CERTFR-2026-CTI-009, which cited infrastructure characteristics, signature tools, a propaganda outlet linked to Shahid Kaveh, and Persian / Farsi traces in the operation. Reporting also named three alleged associates: Hamid Reza Lashgarian, Mahdi Lashgarian and Reza Salarvand. Iran's mission to the United Nations did not respond to Reuters' request for comment, and Iran generally rejects involvement in malicious cyber operations.

Three limits on this attribution need stating. First, it applies to the October France attack only. It does not automatically cover the November wave, the Netherlands, or any other country. Second, it is an official attribution, which is the strongest category this hub uses — but it is still a government assessment based on intelligence, not a court finding. Third, the attribution came almost a month after the attack, which is normal for this kind of work: CERT-FR needed time to analyse infrastructure and tooling before the foreign minister spoke. The November wave, by contrast, has no attribution at all, and the two waves must not be merged.

Fires, food loss and the clean-up

The most dangerous consequence was fire. With defrost heaters running uncontrolled and temperatures reaching 50 degrees Celsius, fires started in at least 15 cases, according to ANSSI as reported. No deaths or injuries from the October wave were confirmed in the sources checked. The food loss was extensive — entire chilled and frozen ranges spoiled overnight — but no single total figure for the value of the food was verified in the sources checked, and this page does not invent one. Stores had to clear cabinets, dispose of spoiled stock, check food safety, and bring refrigeration engineers in before restocking.

The clean-up was also a security operation. CERT-FR's alert gave operators of Danfoss and Copeland / Dixell controllers concrete steps: take controllers off the internet where possible, change default credentials, segment refrigeration networks away from business networks, and patch known vulnerabilities. The lesson was not specific to France. The same controllers are used in supermarkets across Europe, which is why the October attack was followed within three weeks by a second wave — and why the Netherlands, which had just lived through the Ahold Delhaize distribution shutdown, began planning emergency supermarkets that could keep running on generators when digital systems fail.

What it changed — and what it did not prove

The October attack changed two things. It put supermarket refrigeration on the list of critical infrastructure that governments worry about — a category that had previously meant power, water and telecoms — and it gave France a public attribution to carry into the G7. It also changed the public debate in the Netherlands, where the Ahold Delhaize incident and the fridge wave arrived in the same month and were widely discussed together, even though Ahold Delhaize and the Dutch cyber security centre said there was no reason to link them. The full Dutch angle is on the Netherlands hub page about the freezer hacks.

What the October attack did not prove is that every fridge incident afterwards was the same attacker. The November wave used the same method and the same kind of equipment, but Reuters reported it could not establish whether the November attacks were linked to France or to October, and no authority has linked them. Readers who treat the two waves as one attack will get the attribution wrong. They are covered as separate incidents on separate pages in this hub for exactly that reason.

The Dutch angle deserves a final note, because this French incident is the reason the Netherlands hub has a page about supermarket freezer hacks at all. The Netherlands lived through its own food-system shock in the same month — the Ahold Delhaize distribution shutdown detected on 11 October 2026 — and the French fridge attack arrived in Dutch public debate in the same week. The two were discussed together, and the combination is what made the case for emergency supermarkets so quickly: one incident had stopped food from reaching the shops, and the other had spoiled the food that was already in them. But discussion is not evidence. Ahold Delhaize and the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre said there was no reason to link the Ahold incident to the refrigeration attacks, and this hub keeps them separate. The Netherlands hub page on the freezer hacks covers the Dutch side of the story and links back here; the Albert Heijn timeline page covers the Ahold incident in full.

Frequently asked questions

Around 700 by the French government's count (Foreign Minister Barrot and Finance Minister Lescure), and 250-350 by BleepingComputer's estimate. The counts differ by definition — targeted versus successfully compromised — so both are reported with their sources.

France officially attributed the attack on 9 November 2026 to Shahid Kaveh, an offensive cyber unit inside Iran's Revolutionary Guard, based on an ANSSI / CERT-FR report citing infrastructure, signature tools and Persian traces.

Through refrigeration controllers — Danfoss AK-SM / AK-SC and Copeland / Dixell XWEB units — many of which were internet-reachable, some with default credentials. Known vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-41450 and CVE-2025-41451) were identified in the equipment, but no source formally tied a specific CVE to the October entry point.

Attackers forced the units into defrost mode and held them there, so heating elements ran uncontrolled and temperatures reached up to 50 degrees Celsius. Fires started in at least 15 cases, according to ANSSI as reported.

No — they were separate waves, three weeks apart. The October wave hit France; the November wave hit at least eight countries. Reuters reported it could not establish whether they were linked, and the October attribution to Shahid Kaveh does not apply to November.

No deaths or injuries from the October wave were confirmed in the sources checked. The damage was food loss, fire damage in at least 15 stores, and disruption to trading.

Its alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, issued 12 October 2026, advised taking refrigeration controllers off the internet where possible, changing default credentials, segmenting refrigeration networks from business networks, and patching known vulnerabilities.

Sources & check time. CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 (12 Oct 2026, updated 13 & 16 Oct); ANSSI / CERT-FR report CERTFR-2026-CTI-009; Reuters (12 Oct & 9 Nov 2026) via Wikipedia summary of the 2026 European cold chain hacks; DomainTools DTI assessment; Backbox OSINT investigation; BleepingComputer estimate. Last checked Tue 17 Nov 2026.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.