
The Freezer Hacks: What They Meant for the Netherlands
In October and November 2026, attackers took control of supermarket refrigeration systems in Europe — first in France, then in a second wave across at least ten countries, including the Netherlands — and forced freezers into defrost mode, so food had to be discarded. The attacks were one of the two triggers CBL director Marc Jansen cited for accelerating the fase zwart plan. This page covers the Dutch angle: what happened here, what it showed, and what it did not show. The full incident pages for the French wave and the November wave are in the attacks hub.
In short
Attribution: Reported / Claimed only — see below. On the night of 11–12 October 2026, attackers remotely took control of Danfoss refrigeration controllers in French supermarkets (reports range from about 250–350 stores to about 700 stores), forcing evaporators into defrost mode so food had to be discarded; CERT-FR issued alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 on 12 October 2026. On the night of 1–2 November 2026, a second wave drove refrigeration and freezer temperatures up to about 50°C in stores across at least ten European countries — Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and Sweden, per the BBC on 3 November 2026 — and EU officials warned of a deliberate attempt to disrupt the food supply chain. Ahold Delhaize stores in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg were among those hit in the second wave, with about 40 Delhaize supermarkets reported hit, per the BBC. Dutch authorities see no connection between the refrigeration attacks and the Ahold Delhaize cyber incident of October 2026: they are separate events. Attribution of the waves is unverified: France's attribution of the October wave and the pro-Russian groups' claim for the November wave are reported and claimed, not established fact, and the link between the two waves has not been established.
What happened: two waves, one month apart
The refrigeration attacks came in two waves, a month apart, and the distinction matters. The first wave was on the night of 11–12 October 2026, in France. Attackers remotely took control of Danfoss refrigeration controllers in French supermarkets and forced evaporators into defrost mode — in effect, turning freezers into ovens — so the food in them had to be discarded. The number of stores affected is reported differently by different sources: about 250–350 French supermarkets in some reports, about 700 French stores in others. This site reports the range rather than picking a figure, because the sources do not agree and no single authoritative count has been published. CERT-FR, the French national cybersecurity agency, issued alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 on 12 October 2026, updated on 13 and 16 October, naming the affected systems: Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC, Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB controllers. The alert is the most authoritative document on the first wave, and it is a technical alert — it describes the vulnerability and the systems affected — not an attribution.
The second wave was on the night of 1–2 November 2026, and it was wider. Refrigeration and freezer temperatures were driven up to about 50°C (122°F) in stores across at least ten European countries — Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and Sweden — according to the BBC on 3 November 2026. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre confirmed "a couple of instances" in the UK. EU officials warned of a deliberate attempt to disrupt the food supply chain. Among those hit in the second wave were Ahold Delhaize stores in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; Coop and ICA in Sweden; and Spar and Carrefour in Belgium, with about 40 Delhaize supermarkets reported hit, per the BBC. The second wave was reported by Gizmodo on 2 November 2026 and by Facilities Dive on 3 November 2026, consistently with the BBC account. The two waves used the same kind of target — the internet-connected controllers that run supermarket refrigeration — but they were a month apart, in different countries, and at different scales, and the link between them has not been established, according to Reuters-derived reporting.
The Dutch angle: what happened in the Netherlands
The Netherlands was hit in the second wave, on the night of 1–2 November 2026. Ahold Delhaize stores in the Netherlands were among those affected, according to Facilities Dive on 3 November 2026 and Gizmodo on 2 November 2026. That is the extent of what can be said with confidence about the Dutch impact from the sources available for this site. No Dutch store count has been published, no list of affected Dutch towns or stores exists, and no Dutch authority has published a statement quantifying the Dutch damage. The absence of detail is itself informative: the second wave was a European event reported at European scale, and the Dutch component was reported as part of a ten-country list, not as a standalone Dutch incident with its own casualty count. What the Dutch impact does show is that the Netherlands' food system is exposed to the same vulnerability as its neighbours, because it uses the same equipment. Danfoss controllers — and the Copeland and Dixell systems named in the CERT-FR alert — are standard equipment in supermarkets across Europe, including the Netherlands, and they are connected to the internet so they can be monitored and managed remotely. That connectivity is what makes them efficient, and it is what made them attackable: an attacker who can reach the controller can change its settings, and a controller set to defrost will warm food until it is unsafe to sell. The Dutch lesson is therefore not about a uniquely Dutch failure, but about a shared European one — and that is why the Dutch response, the noodwinkel plan, is framed as a European-scale resilience question, not a Dutch-only fix.
Why a freezer is a food-security problem
A freezer attack sounds less serious than a distribution-centre shutdown, and in one sense it is: it affects the food in one store, not the food for a whole region. But it is a food-security problem for three reasons. First, it destroys food that cannot be replaced quickly: once chilled or frozen food has warmed past a safe temperature, it must be discarded, and the store must be restocked from a distribution centre that may itself be under strain. Second, it is hard to detect quickly: a freezer that is warming looks normal from the aisle, and the damage is discovered when a temperature alarm sounds or when staff check the units — by which time the food may already be lost. Third, and most importantly for the fase zwart story, it attacks the cold chain — the unbroken chain of refrigeration from producer to shop to home that keeps fresh and frozen food safe. The cold chain is one of the food system's most digital dependencies: it is monitored, controlled and alarmed by connected systems, and if those systems are compromised, the food they protect is compromised with them. The October and November waves showed that the cold chain can be attacked at scale, across borders, in a single night. That is why CBL director Marc Jansen cited the refrigeration attacks alongside the Albert Heijn incident as a reason to accelerate the fase zwart plan: one showed that the ordering and distribution systems could stop, the other showed that the refrigeration systems could be turned against the food itself. Together they cover the two ways a digital attack can empty a supermarket — by stopping food arriving, and by destroying the food that is already there.
Attribution: what is reported, what is claimed, what is not established
Attribution for the refrigeration attacks is the least settled part of the story, and this page reports it with the care the plan's editorial rules require. For the October wave, French Foreign Minister Barrot announced on 9 November 2026 that France attributed the attack to Shahid Kaveh, a cyber unit of Iran's IRGC — but that attribution was reported by secondary sources, including a Medium report of 12 November 2026, and was not confirmed against a French government or law-enforcement primary source in the research for this site. It is therefore reported here as a reported attribution, not as established fact. For the November wave, the pro-Russian groups NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest claimed the attack on Telegram on 3 November 2026, according to a blog report — a claim, not a confirmation, and not verified against any official source. A claim of responsibility is not proof of responsibility, and this site does not treat it as such. And the link between the two waves has not been established, according to Reuters-derived reporting: the fact that both targeted refrigeration controllers does not prove they were carried out by the same actor, and the two waves may have been independent attacks that exploited the same vulnerability. Readers should therefore be cautious about coverage that presents a single culprit for both waves, or that treats a Telegram claim as a confirmed attribution. The verified facts are the attacks themselves — the dates, the countries, the temperatures, the systems named in the CERT-FR alert — and the attribution remains, as of 17 November 2026, reported and claimed, not established.
Separate from Albert Heijn — and why the distinction matters
The refrigeration attacks and the Ahold Delhaize cyber incident are separate events, and the distinction is one of the hard corrections for this whole site. Dutch authorities see no connection between the Ahold Delhaize incident and the refrigeration-controller attacks. The two happened in the same month, they both affected supermarkets, and they were both cited by CBL director Marc Jansen as reasons to accelerate the fase zwart plan — but they were different attacks, on different systems, by (as far as is known) different actors, with different effects. The Ahold Delhaize incident hit central IT and logistics: systems were taken offline, distribution centres stopped, shelves emptied, deliveries were suspended. The refrigeration attacks hit store-level controllers: freezers were forced into defrost, food was destroyed, stores had to discard stock. Merging them into a single "supermarket cyberattack" would mislead readers in two ways: it would imply a coordinated campaign for which there is no evidence, and it would obscure the fact that the food system has more than one digital vulnerability — the logistics systems and the refrigeration systems are different targets, and defending one does not defend the other. The noodwinkel plan addresses both, in different ways: generators and analogue supply address the logistics failure, and the limited essential assortment — with an emphasis on long-life food that does not depend on refrigeration — addresses the cold-chain failure. That is a further reason to keep the two events distinct in coverage.
What changed after the waves
The immediate technical response was the CERT-FR alert of 12 October 2026, which named the affected controller models and told operators how to protect them — in essence, to take the controllers off the open internet, to change default credentials, and to segment them from the rest of the network. The wider response was political: EU officials warned of a deliberate attempt to disrupt the food supply chain, and the attacks became part of the European preparedness debate that produced the EU's non-binding guidance of 30 October 2026 on 72-hour self-sufficiency. In the Netherlands, the response was the acceleration of the fase zwart plan: CBL director Marc Jansen said preparation had gone into overdrive because of the Albert Heijn incident and the refrigeration attacks, and the noodwinkel plan — generators, essential food only, analogue supply — is designed, in part, for a world in which the refrigeration in a normal supermarket cannot be trusted. What has not changed, as of 17 November 2026, is the underlying vulnerability: supermarket refrigeration controllers remain connected systems, the CERT-FR alert remains the most authoritative technical guidance, and no public report has confirmed that all affected controllers across Europe have been secured. The full incident pages — the French October wave and the European November wave — are in the attacks hub, and they carry the detailed timelines, the CERT-FR alert and the attribution reporting.
Frequently asked questions
Attacks on internet-connected refrigeration controllers in supermarkets, in two waves: France on the night of 11–12 October 2026, and at least ten European countries, including the Netherlands, on the night of 1–2 November 2026. Freezers were forced into defrost mode and food had to be discarded.
Yes, in the second wave on the night of 1–2 November 2026. Ahold Delhaize stores in the Netherlands were among those hit. No Dutch store count or list of affected towns has been published.
Danfoss is a manufacturer of refrigeration controllers used in supermarkets across Europe. The CERT-FR alert of 12 October 2026 named Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC controllers, along with Copeland XWEB and Dixell XWEB, as the affected systems.
In the second wave, refrigeration and freezer temperatures were driven up to about 50°C (122°F), according to reporting of the 1–2 November 2026 wave.
Attribution is not established. France's attribution of the October wave to an IRGC unit is reported, not confirmed against a primary source; pro-Russian groups claimed the November wave on Telegram, which is a claim, not proof. The link between the waves has not been established.
No verified connection. Dutch authorities see no connection between the Ahold Delhaize incident and the refrigeration-controller attacks. They are separate events on different systems.
The alert issued by CERT-FR, the French national cybersecurity agency, on 12 October 2026 (updated 13 and 16 October), naming the affected refrigeration controller models and giving protection guidance.
Food that warmed past a safe temperature had to be discarded. The attacks destroyed stock in the affected stores, which then had to be restocked — that is why the cold chain is a food-security issue, not just a technical one.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.