
Poland: The Power Grid Wiper Attack of 29-30 December 2025
In the last days of 2025, during snowstorms and sub-zero temperatures, attackers struck Poland's power sector with malware designed not to steal data but to destroy it. More than 30 wind farms and solar installations, two combined heat and power plants, a renewable-energy management system and a manufacturing company were targeted. One of the plants supplied heating to nearly 500,000 people. Poland's digital affairs minister said the country came very close to a blackout. The lights stayed on — but only because detection software stopped the malware at one plant. Who did it is still disputed: two respected sources name two different Russian groups.
In short
Attribution: Conflicting — CERT Polska attributes the attack to Static Tundra / Berserk Bear, assessed as linked to Russia's FSB (Center 16); ESET and Dragos attribute it, with medium confidence, to Sandworm (GRU Unit 74455 / APT44). Neither attribution is settled fact. On 29-30 December 2025, during snowstorms and sub-zero temperatures just before New Year, a coordinated attack hit power substations connecting wind and solar plants to the Polish grid, plus two combined heat and power (CHP) plants, a renewable-energy management system and a manufacturing company. The attackers deployed wiper malware ESET named DynoWiper (Win32/KillFiles.NMO), built to irreversibly destroy data and render systems inoperable. The intrusion into at least one CHP plant dated to March 2025 — nine months of dwell time. There was no successful or lasting disruption to electricity or heat supply, because endpoint detection software at the CHP plant blocked DynoWiper from executing; communications were impacted. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Poland had repelled the attack and later described it as Russian sabotage aimed at causing a mid-winter blackout.
What happened on 29-30 December 2025
Attribution: Conflicting — CERT Polska says Berserk Bear / FSB; ESET and Dragos say Sandworm / GRU (medium confidence). The attack ran on 29-30 December 2025, in Central European Time, during snowstorms and sub-zero temperatures and just before the New Year holiday. The targets were power substations connecting wind and solar plants to the grid — more than 30 wind farms and solar installations — along with two combined heat and power plants, a renewable-energy management system and a manufacturing company. One of the CHP plants supplied heating to nearly 500,000 people. The timing was not accidental: a heating failure in sub-zero weather, days before New Year, would have been a humanitarian emergency as well as a power emergency.
CERT Polska, Poland's national cyber incident response team, published its report on 30 January 2026. ESET published its analysis on 23 January 2026, and CISA issued a global alert in February 2026. CERT Polska used the word 'arson' in its report — a deliberate choice of language for an attack designed to destroy rather than steal. Entry was reported, in secondary reporting, via Fortinet FortiGate VPN endpoints exposed without multi-factor authentication. The attack was coordinated across multiple targets at once, which is what marks it out from an ordinary intrusion: this was a planned operation against the energy sector, not a single compromised server.
Nine months inside before the attack
The most dangerous part of the attack happened months before anyone noticed. The intrusion into at least one CHP plant was dated to March 2025 — nine months before the December attack. For nine months, the attackers were inside the plant's systems, learning how they worked, mapping the network, and positioning the wiper for a coordinated strike. That dwell time is what separates a state-linked operation from a criminal ransomware attack: criminals want to encrypt quickly and get paid; saboteurs want to understand the target well enough to break it at the moment of maximum effect.
The nine-month dwell also explains why the attack was so broad. By December, the attackers had access to substations, wind and solar installations, CHP plants and a management system — a spread that takes time to build. It is also a warning about detection: the intrusion was not caught for nine months, and it was the wiper's execution, not the intrusion, that finally triggered the defences. Organisations that measure their security by whether an attack succeeded can miss the months of quiet access that preceded it.
DynoWiper: what the malware was built to do
The wiper was named DynoWiper by ESET (detection name Win32/KillFiles.NMO). A wiper is different from ransomware. Ransomware encrypts data and offers to sell the key back. A wiper destroys data irreversibly, with no key and no recovery. DynoWiper was designed to render systems inoperable — to delete the data and configurations that power plants need to run, so that even after the attackers were gone, the plant could not simply be rebooted. In a power plant, that means not just a blackout but a long, difficult restoration, with engineers rebuilding systems from backups or from scratch in sub-zero weather.
The choice of a wiper is itself evidence about intent. There is no money in a wiper. There is no data to sell and no ransom to collect. The only payoff is damage — to the grid, to heating, to public confidence. That is why CERT Polska's use of the word 'arson' fits, and why Prime Minister Donald Tusk later described the attack as Russian sabotage aimed at causing a blackout in mid-winter. The malware's purpose was destruction, and its target was civilian energy infrastructure in the middle of winter.
Why the lights stayed on
There was no successful or lasting disruption to electricity or heat supply, according to both ESET and CERT Polska. The reason is specific and worth stating precisely: endpoint detection and response (EDR) software at the CHP plant blocked DynoWiper from executing. The wiper was deployed; it did not run. Communications were impacted, but the plant kept generating heat and power. The attack failed at the point of execution, not at the point of entry — the attackers got in, positioned their malware, and were stopped by the last line of defence.
That is a narrower escape than it sounds. Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said the attack came very close to a blackout. If the EDR software had not been present, or had not recognised the wiper, the December attack could have taken heating from nearly half a million people in sub-zero temperatures. The lesson Poland drew publicly was about detection and segmentation: the attack succeeded in getting in through exposed VPN endpoints and staying undetected for nine months, and it was stopped only by software on the endpoint itself. Defence in depth — not a single product — is the difference between a repelled attack and a mid-winter blackout.
The human stakes are worth stating plainly. The CHP plant at the centre of the attack supplied heating to nearly 500,000 people, in sub-zero temperatures, days before New Year. A heating failure on that scale is not an inconvenience. It is frozen pipes, uninhabitable homes, and hospitals and care facilities struggling to keep patients warm. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Poland had repelled the attack, and later described it as Russian sabotage aimed at causing a blackout in mid-winter. The language is political, but the underlying fact is technical: the attackers chose the coldest week of the year and a target that would have hurt civilians first. That choice of timing and target is part of why this attack is treated in this hub as sabotage rather than espionage or crime.
Two attributions, one attack
Attribution: Conflicting, as stated above — present both, pick neither. CERT Polska attributed the attack to a cluster it calls Static Tundra, also known as Berserk Bear, which it assesses as linked to Russia's FSB, specifically Center 16. ESET and Dragos attributed it, with medium confidence, to Sandworm — GRU Unit 74455, also known as APT44 — based on overlap between DynoWiper's malware and tactics and previous Sandworm wipers. These are not the same group. Berserk Bear is assessed as FSB; Sandworm is GRU. They are different Russian services, different units, different histories.
Both attributions are serious, and both come from credible sources. CERT Polska is the national authority that investigated the incident. ESET and Dragos are respected threat-intelligence firms with long records on Sandworm. The conflict may reflect different evidence — different infrastructure, different tooling, different parts of a multi-target operation — or it may reflect the genuine difficulty of attributing an operation that used shared or copied tooling. What this hub will not do is pick one and present it as settled. Until the two accounts are reconciled, the honest statement is: CERT Polska says Berserk Bear / FSB; ESET and Dragos say Sandworm / GRU with medium confidence. Readers who see only one of those attributions elsewhere are seeing half the story.
A second disclosure — and why we do not double-count it
A separate CERT Polska disclosure, presented at DEF CON in August 2026 and reported by SC Media, described a December 2025 shutdown at a CHP plant serving about 50,000 residents, initially blamed on operator error, in fact a cyberattack traced back to a wind farm. In that incident, Siemens PLCs were put into stop mode with blocking passwords, a steam turbine and water treatment were halted, and a Wago controller was bricked beyond factory reset. This may overlap with, or be a component of, the 29-30 December 2025 attack described above — the dates, the sector and the wind-farm entry point all match. It is listed here as a related disclosure, not as a separate verified incident, and it is not added to the count of plants or people affected. Double-counting it would inflate the scale of the attack without evidence that it was a distinct event. If CERT Polska's primary report clarifies the relationship, this page will be updated.
Frequently asked questions
Attackers hit more than 30 wind and solar installations, two combined heat and power plants, a renewable-energy management system and a manufacturing company with wiper malware called DynoWiper, during snowstorms and sub-zero temperatures.
No. There was no lasting disruption to electricity or heat, because endpoint detection software at a CHP plant blocked the wiper from executing. Communications were impacted, and the digital affairs minister said Poland came very close to a blackout.
Wiper malware named by ESET (Win32/KillFiles.NMO), designed to irreversibly destroy data and render systems inoperable. Unlike ransomware, it offers no recovery — its only purpose is damage.
Attribution conflicts. CERT Polska attributes the attack to Berserk Bear (Static Tundra), assessed as linked to Russia's FSB. ESET and Dragos attribute it to Sandworm (GRU Unit 74455) with medium confidence. Neither is presented here as settled fact.
The intrusion into at least one combined heat and power plant was dated to March 2025 — about nine months before the December attack. The attackers used that time to map systems and position the wiper.
Secondary reporting says entry was via Fortinet FortiGate VPN endpoints exposed without multi-factor authentication. That is reported, not confirmed in CERT Polska's primary report as checked.
It may be the same attack. CERT Polska disclosed at DEF CON in August 2026 a December 2025 CHP shutdown serving about 50,000 residents, traced to a wind farm. It is treated here as a related disclosure, not double-counted as a separate incident.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.