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Europe: The Second Supermarket Fridge Wave, 1-2 November 2026

Three weeks after the October attack on French supermarkets, it happened again — this time across Europe. On the night of 1-2 November 2026, refrigeration units in supermarkets in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Poland and Spain were forced into defrost mode, food spoiled, and the same questions returned: who did this, and is it connected to October? As of 17 November 2026, neither question has an authoritative answer. This page gives the verified account of the second wave and is explicit about what is not known.

In short

Attribution: None confirmed. On the night of 1-2 November 2026, from about 02:00 local time, attackers again forced supermarket refrigeration and freezer units into defrost mode, pushing temperatures toward about 50 degrees Celsius and spoiling food. Belgium was hardest hit, with about 40 Delhaize stores, 15 Carrefour Belgium stores and 5 Spar / Colruyt stores reported. Sweden reported about 23 ICA stores and 7 Coop stores; Ireland reported 13 SuperValu stores; Germany reported at least 7 sites in 4 states including REWE, Edeka and CAP; the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland (Kesko reported irregular temperatures), Italy, Portugal, Poland and Spain were also hit. Reuters counted 8 countries and the BBC listed at least 10; the total was more than 100-115 stores. No authority has attributed the wave, Reuters reported it could not establish whether it was linked to the October France attack, and a Telegram claim by pro-Russian groups NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest is unverified.

What happened on the night of 1-2 November 2026

Attribution: None confirmed. The second wave began overnight on 1-2 November 2026, from about 02:00 local time, in Central European Time and the local times of the countries affected. The method was the same as in October: refrigeration and freezer units forced into defrost mode, temperatures rising toward about 50 degrees Celsius, food spoiling in cabinets that should have stayed frozen or chilled. Danfoss controllers were again among the systems targeted. The wave was discovered as staff arrived in the morning and found warm cabinets and spoiled stock, the same pattern as three weeks earlier.

The scale was smaller than October in any single country but wider geographically. Where October was concentrated in France, November spread across a continent in one night. That spread is itself a fact worth noting: the attackers reached controllers in at least eight countries — Reuters' count — and at least ten by the BBC's listing, in a single overnight operation. The total store count, aggregated by BleepingComputer, was more than 100-115 stores. EU Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen called it a deliberate attempt to disrupt food supply, while saying food security was not currently at risk.

Where it hit: country by country

Belgium was the hardest hit. About 40 Delhaize stores, 15 Carrefour Belgium stores and 5 Spar / Colruyt stores were reported affected. Sweden reported about 23 ICA stores and 7 Coop stores. Ireland reported 13 SuperValu stores. Germany reported at least 7 sites in 4 states, including REWE, Edeka and CAP stores. The Netherlands was among the countries hit overnight, though no consistent Dutch store count was reported in the sources checked — Reuters counted stores in 8 countries and the BBC listed at least 10, and the Dutch figure sits inside that range without a firm number of its own. Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland (where Kesko reported irregular temperatures), Italy, Portugal, Poland and Spain were also reported hit.

No Dutch-specific death, injury or food-safety incident from the November wave was confirmed in the sources checked. The same is true for the other countries in the wave: the damage was spoiled food and disrupted trading, not casualties. That matters because the seriousness of the wave is sometimes overstated in both directions — either as a catastrophe or as a prank. It was neither. It was a deliberate, multi-country sabotage of food refrigeration that destroyed stock and forced stores to close cabinets and throw food away, without causing confirmed injuries.

The same method, a different question

The November wave used the same method as October and hit the same kind of equipment, which is why many readers assumed it was the same attacker. That assumption is not supported by the public evidence. Reuters reported it could not establish whether the November attacks were linked to the France / October attacks. No authority has linked them. The October attribution to Shahid Kaveh, announced on 9 November 2026 — a week after the second wave — applies to the October France attack only, and France's attribution documents do not extend it to November.

There are two honest ways to read the similarity. One is that the same actor returned. The other is that the October attack published a working method — exposed Danfoss controllers, default credentials, defrost commands — and a different actor copied it. Both readings are consistent with the public evidence, and neither is confirmed. This hub does not choose between them. What can be said is that the second wave proves the vulnerability was not fixed after October: three weeks after CERT-FR's alert, controllers in at least eight countries were still reachable and still running with the same weaknesses.

The Telegram claim — and why it is unverified

Attribution: Claimed only, unverified. On 3-4 November 2026, the pro-Russian hacktivist groups NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest claimed responsibility for the November wave via Telegram. The claim is unverified and this page does not treat it as attribution. The details in the claim were already public by the time it was posted, no independent forensic evidence has authenticated it, and the claim was deleted within hours, according to one report. A claim that adds no non-public detail and disappears within hours is weak evidence, and hacktivist groups have a record of claiming attacks they did not carry out.

Belgium's Centre for Cybersecurity put the position plainly: it is not known who is behind this attack, and it may never be determined. That is the authoritative statement on the November wave as of 17 November 2026, and it stands unless and until a CERT, an intelligence agency or a law-enforcement body says otherwise. Readers should be wary of any account — on social media or elsewhere — that presents the November wave as solved. It is not solved.

The official response

The European response came fast. On 4 November 2026 the European Commission, ENISA, Europol's EC3, EU-CyCLONe and the EU CSIRT Network issued a joint statement on the incident. EU Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen described the wave as a deliberate attempt to disrupt food supply while stressing that food security was not currently at risk — a careful distinction between the intent of the attack and its actual effect. National CERTs issued guidance, and the same mitigations circulated as after October: take controllers off the internet, change default credentials, segment refrigeration networks.

The response also exposed a gap. The October alert had named the equipment and the method, yet the November wave succeeded anyway, across more countries. That suggests the problem is not a lack of information but a lack of action — controllers that were still exposed three weeks after a public alert, in chains that had just watched hundreds of French stores lose their stock. The Netherlands' Phase Black planning, reported on 15 November 2026, is one answer to that gap: emergency supermarkets that can operate on generators when digital systems fail. The plan itself is covered on the Netherlands hub.

What is still unknown

Attribution: None confirmed — DEVELOPING as of Tue 17 Nov 2026. Four things remain unknown. Who carried out the November wave is unknown. Whether it is linked to the October wave is unknown. How the attackers got in — which vulnerability or credential, in which country — is not established in the public record. And the full store count is uncertain: more than 100-115 by aggregation, with the Netherlands and several other countries lacking a firm published figure. This page will be updated if an authority attributes the wave or establishes a link, and any update will be dated so readers can see what changed and when.

One related incident from the same night is covered on its own page because it is a different target: the French blood service, EFS, whose plasma cold rooms were targeted overnight on 1-2 November 2026. French officials have not linked the EFS incident to the supermarket attacks, and this hub does not link them either.

What would it take to resolve the unknowns? An attribution would need forensic evidence of the kind that supported the October attribution: infrastructure analysis, tooling signatures, language traces, or a link to a known group, published by a CERT, an intelligence agency or a law-enforcement body — not a social-media claim. A link between the waves would need the same standard: shared infrastructure or tooling, or a statement from an authority that investigated both. A firm store count would need national figures from each affected country, which have not been published for the Netherlands and several other countries in the wave. Until those appear, the honest position is the one this page takes: the method is known, the scale is approximately known, and the actor is not.

Frequently asked questions

Overnight on 1-2 November 2026, from about 02:00 local time. It came three weeks after the October wave in France.

Belgium was hardest hit, followed by Sweden, Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands, with Luxembourg, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Poland and Spain also reported. Reuters counted 8 countries; the BBC listed at least 10.

More than 100-115 stores in total, by BleepingComputer's aggregation. Belgium reported about 40 Delhaize, 15 Carrefour and 5 Spar / Colruyt stores; Sweden about 23 ICA and 7 Coop; Ireland 13 SuperValu.

Nobody confirmed. No authority has attributed the November wave. A Telegram claim by NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest is unverified, and Belgium's Centre for Cybersecurity said it may never be determined who was behind it.

Not established. Reuters reported it could not establish whether the November attacks were linked to France / October, and the October attribution to Shahid Kaveh applies to October only.

No. EU Agriculture Commissioner Christophe Hansen called it a deliberate attempt to disrupt food supply but said food security was not currently at risk. The damage was spoiled food and disrupted trading in the affected stores.

The same controllers were still exposed. CERT-FR's October alert named the equipment and the mitigations, but controllers in at least eight countries were still internet-reachable with the same weaknesses when the second wave hit.

Sources & check time. Security-Breaches / Reuters summary (3 Nov 2026); Rescana status (2 Nov 2026); EU joint statement (European Commission, ENISA, Europol EC3, EU-CyCLONe, EU CSIRT Network, 4 Nov 2026); DomainTools DTI assessment; BleepingComputer aggregation; Belgium Centre for Cybersecurity. Last checked Tue 17 Nov 2026.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.