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USA: Hospitals & Healthcare Ransomware — Change Healthcare & DaVita

Healthcare is the most-targeted sector in ransomware, and the two cases on this page show why. Change Healthcare processes about one in three medical claims in the United States. When it was hit in February 2024, pharmacies could not verify insurance, hospitals could not send claims, and the personal data of about 190 million people was stolen — the largest healthcare breach in American history. A year later, DaVita, the kidney-dialysis company that keeps about 200,000 patients alive on regular treatment, was hit by the Interlock group, and the health data of 2.7 million people was compromised. Both attacks entered through ordinary weaknesses. Both were preventable in the specific sense that the door they used was known and unlocked.

In short

Attribution: Change Healthcare — ALPHV / BlackCat ransomware operation (criminal, not state-attributed). DaVita — Interlock ransomware group (claimed; FBI / CISA / HHS / MS-ISAC joint warning on Interlock, July 2025). Change Healthcare: intrusion 12 February 2024 via compromised credentials on a Citrix remote-access portal that lacked multi-factor authentication; ransomware deployed about 21 February 2024; disclosed 21 February 2024; about 190 million individuals affected (January 2025 estimate), final HHS portal count 192.7 million (6 August 2025); about $22 million ransom reported paid; total damage estimated at more than $2.45 billion. DaVita: network access 24 March-12 April 2025; disclosed 14 April 2025 (SEC 8-K); data leaked 24 April 2025; electronic protected health information of 2,689,826 individuals compromised (HHS final count, August 2025); Interlock claimed more than 20 TB exfiltrated and leaked about 1.5 TB after the ransom was not paid; about $13.5 million in incident costs in Q2 2025; preliminary $15 million class-action settlement approved 21 August 2026.

Change Healthcare: one portal, 190 million people

Attribution: ALPHV / BlackCat (criminal ransomware operation, not state-attributed). The intrusion began on 12 February 2024, when an ALPHV / BlackCat affiliate gained access through compromised credentials on a Citrix remote-access portal that lacked multi-factor authentication. That fact was confirmed by UnitedHealth Group CEO Andrew Witty in testimony to Congress in May 2024, and it is the single most important detail in this case: the largest healthcare breach in US history began with a login page that did not require a second factor. Ransomware was deployed on about 21 February 2024, the incident was disclosed the same day, and systems were encrypted and data exfiltrated.

The consequences spread across the American healthcare system because Change Healthcare processes about one in three US medical claims. Pharmacies could not verify insurance or process prescriptions for weeks. Hospitals could not send claims and could not get paid. The human cost was measured in delayed prescriptions and delayed care, not only in stolen data. The final count of affected individuals was about 190 million (January 2025 estimate), revised to 192.7 million on the HHS portal on 6 August 2025 — the largest healthcare data breach in US history by a wide margin. A ransom of about $22 million was reported paid in Bitcoin, and ALPHV exit-scammed in March 2024, meaning an affiliate was left unpaid after the payment. Total damage was estimated at more than $2.45 billion.

DaVita: dialysis, data and a $15 million settlement

Attribution: Interlock ransomware group (claimed; joint FBI / CISA / HHS / MS-ISAC warning on Interlock, July 2025). DaVita Inc. runs more than 2,600 outpatient dialysis centres in the United States, serving about 200,000 patients who rely on regular dialysis to stay alive. The Interlock group accessed DaVita's network between 24 March and 12 April 2025, exfiltrated data and encrypted files. DaVita disclosed the incident on 14 April 2025 in an SEC 8-K filing, and Interlock leaked data on 24 April 2025 after the ransom was not paid. Patient care continued: DaVita relied on manual processes and backup systems, and dialysis treatment was not interrupted.

The electronic protected health information of 2,689,826 individuals was compromised, according to the final HHS count in August 2025. Interlock claimed to have exfiltrated more than 20 TB of data and leaked about 1.5 TB. DaVita reported about $13.5 million in incident costs in Q2 2025 — that figure covers the second quarter only, and other reporting put the 2025 total at $25 million; the two figures measure different periods and should not be mixed. A preliminary $15 million class-action settlement was approved on 21 August 2026 in Jenkins et al. v. DaVita in Colorado. The case matters because of what was at stake: dialysis cannot be postponed, and a ransomware attack on a dialysis provider is an attack on people whose treatment schedule is a matter of survival.

Why healthcare is the most-targeted sector

Healthcare is targeted for three reasons that reinforce each other. First, the data is the most valuable: a health record contains identity, insurance, medical history and payment information in one place, and it cannot be cancelled like a credit card. Second, the pressure to pay is the highest: a hospital or dialysis provider that cannot operate puts lives at risk, and attackers know that urgency makes payment more likely. Third, the defences are often the weakest: hospitals run a mix of old and new systems, medical devices that cannot be patched, and a large workforce with high turnover — all of which create the kind of ordinary weakness that the Change Healthcare portal represented.

The Dutch experience underlines the point. In April 2026, ChipSoft — the vendor behind the HiX electronic patient record used by about 70-75 percent of Dutch hospitals — was hit by ransomware. The attack was detected on 7 April 2026 and disclosed on 8-9 April. ChipSoft took its Zorgportaal, HiX Mobile and Zorgplatform offline as a precaution, and at least 11 hospitals disconnected from ChipSoft systems, including Erasmus MC. The Embargo group claimed about 100 GB of data stolen and threatened publication about two weeks later; on 28 April 2026 the company said stolen data had been destroyed. ChipSoft said it could not rule out that patient data had been accessed or stolen. No critical medical processes were reported halted, but hospitals reverted to alternative procedures for days. The Dutch case is covered in brief here because it shows the same pattern in a different country: a single software vendor, used by most hospitals, becomes a single point of failure for a national health system.

The missing multi-factor authentication

The Change Healthcare case turns on a single control: multi-factor authentication. The Citrix portal that the attackers used did not have it. A password alone was enough. That is not an obscure technical detail. It is the most basic access control in modern security, and its absence on a remote-access portal at a company processing a third of America's medical claims is the kind of failure that regulators, insurers and Congress all fastened on. CEO Andrew Witty confirmed the absence in his May 2024 testimony, and the confirmation matters because it removes any ambiguity: this was not a sophisticated bypass of a strong control. It was a missing control.

The same lesson runs through the other cases in this hub. The Norwegian dam had a weak password. The French fridge controllers had default credentials. The Polish power plants had VPN endpoints without multi-factor authentication. In each case, the attackers did not need to defeat a strong defence; they needed to find a door that had been left unlocked. Healthcare is not uniquely careless — it is uniquely exposed, because its systems are numerous, its staff are many, and its operations cannot stop for a security upgrade. But the fix in the Change Healthcare case was not expensive or exotic. It was multi-factor authentication on a remote-access portal.

What the ransoms bought — and did not buy

Change Healthcare reportedly paid about $22 million in Bitcoin. The payment did not buy a clean resolution: ALPHV exit-scammed in March 2024, and the data was still exposed. DaVita did not pay, and Interlock leaked about 1.5 TB of data in response. Neither outcome is a vindication of either choice. Paying did not guarantee the data would be deleted or the attackers would go away. Not paying did not prevent the leak. The honest summary is that once data has been exfiltrated, the victim's options are all bad, and the decision that matters is the one taken before the attack — whether the data was protected, whether the access was controlled, and whether the backups and manual procedures were ready.

The financial scale is worth stating plainly. Change Healthcare: more than $2.45 billion in estimated total damage, against a $22 million ransom. DaVita: $13.5 million in Q2 2025 incident costs, and a $15 million class-action settlement. These are not the costs of the ransom. They are the costs of the disruption, the recovery, the legal exposure and the regulatory consequences. The ransom is the smallest number in the story, which is why the debate about whether to pay misses the point: the damage is done before the ransom is even discussed.

The third case: Boston Scientific, August-September 2026

Attribution: None — no group publicly claimed it. A third American healthcare case belongs on this page as a coda, because it shows the pattern continuing into the autumn of 2026. Boston Scientific, the medical-device maker, detected unauthorised activity on 25 August 2026 and disclosed it on 26 August in a Form 8-K Item 8.01 filing, with a materiality filing (Item 1.05) on 8 September 2026. The company took core enterprise networks offline; order processing, manufacturing and shipping halted. Cloud systems were unaffected, implanted cardiac devices continued to function, and remote activation of certain cardiac monitors was interrupted. Shipping was restored for the majority of products at major distribution centres by 3 September 2026.

The outage lasted 8 business days by one framing and about 2 weeks by another — the company gave both framings on its earnings call, and this page does not reconcile them into a single number. The Q3 sales impact was about $150 million (about 300 basis points of growth, $0.07 adjusted earnings per share), per the earnings call on 28 October 2026. No group publicly claimed the attack. The case is a reminder that healthcare ransomware is not only about hospitals and insurers: the companies that make the devices hospitals use are targets too, and an attack on them stops the supply of medical equipment in the same way an attack on a hospital stops care.

Frequently asked questions

About 190 million by the January 2025 estimate, and 192.7 million by the final HHS portal count on 6 August 2025 — the largest healthcare data breach in US history.

Through compromised credentials on a Citrix remote-access portal that lacked multi-factor authentication, confirmed by CEO Andrew Witty in Congress in May 2024. Ransomware was deployed about 21 February 2024.

About $22 million in Bitcoin was reported paid. ALPHV exit-scammed in March 2024, and total damage was estimated at more than $2.45 billion.

Electronic protected health information of 2,689,826 individuals was compromised, according to the final HHS count in August 2025. Interlock claimed more than 20 TB exfiltrated and leaked about 1.5 TB.

No. Patient care continued on manual processes and backup systems. The attack compromised data and encrypted files; it did not interrupt dialysis treatment.

Detected 7 April 2026, ChipSoft's HiX patient-record systems were taken offline and at least 11 hospitals disconnected. The Embargo group claimed about 100 GB stolen. ChipSoft said it could not rule out patient data access. No critical medical processes were reported halted.

Unauthorised activity detected 25 August 2026 took core networks offline, halting order processing, manufacturing and shipping for 8 business days (about 2 weeks by the company's other framing). Q3 sales impact was about $150 million. No group claimed it.

Sources & check time. NoHack (10 Nov 2026, Change Healthcare); Mason LLP (19 Oct 2026); HHS breach portal (final count 6 Aug 2025); HIPAA Journal (1 Sep 2026, DaVita); BlackFog (10 Apr 2026, DaVita); Cybernews (9 Apr 2026, ChipSoft); Guardey (10 Sep 2026, ChipSoft); Manufacturing Mag (Sep 2026, Boston Scientific); CEO Andrew Witty congressional testimony (May 2024). Last checked Tue 17 Nov 2026.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 12:50 PKT.