Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack: Malware on 178 Organisations' Websites, 16 November 2026
On Monday 16 November 2026, visitors to some of the most-visited websites on the internet were served malicious JavaScript. The code did not come from those sites' own servers. It came from the Optimizely Web snippet those sites load for A/B testing, served from cdn.optimizely.com with a valid Optimizely certificate, inside a file that looked exactly like the testing snippet it had always been. By the end of the day, 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations had been found — CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, IKEA, Air France-KLM and Peacock among them. This page gives the verified account: what happened, how it worked, what it stole, what Optimizely has said, and what is still unknown.
In short
Attribution: None confirmed — no threat actor has been publicly named. On Monday 16 November 2026, attackers injected malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects, and the code was then served to visitors from cdn.optimizely.com — a host every affected site already trusted. Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, IKEA, Air France-KLM and Peacock. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment-card details typed into site forms, stole cookies and page screenshots, and pushed iPhone and iPad visitors toward iOS exploit kits. About $7,040 in cryptocurrency had reached attacker wallets by 19:25 UTC; later on-chain reviews put confirmed theft lower, at around $2,300 to $6,600 — the exact total is developing. Optimizely confirmed the incident on 17 November 2026, saying a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow was exploited, and said it had blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code and contacted affected customers. By 21:52 UTC on 16 November only one infected snippet remained, at UK broadband provider TalkTalk. The affected companies' own servers were not breached: this was a supply-chain attack through a trusted third party.
What happened on Monday 16 November 2026
On Monday 16 November 2026, visitors to some of the most-visited websites on the internet were served malicious JavaScript. The code did not come from those sites' own servers. It came from the Optimizely Web snippet those sites load for A/B testing, served from cdn.optimizely.com with a valid Optimizely certificate, inside a file that looked exactly like the A/B testing snippet it had always been. The first injection was found in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC, about two hours after the last clean capture of that file. The main malicious script was live on bbc.com by 08:28 UTC. Through the morning the infection spread across Optimizely customer projects: by the time Scott Helme of the security monitoring service Report URI published his findings, his team had fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found 188 of them carrying attacker-written code, belonging to 178 organisations. The named list reads like a roll call of the busiest sites on the internet: CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, IKEA, Air France-KLM, Peacock and Smartsheet, with Optimizely's own marketing site also carrying the code from 15:45 UTC. A card-skimming component was added at 13:43 UTC. At 19:24 UTC a sweep found 186 infected snippets. A mass clean-up between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC removed the code from nearly all of them — Ledger at 20:41, Smartsheet at 20:56, the BBC at 21:07 — and by 21:52 UTC only one infected snippet remained, belonging to UK broadband provider TalkTalk. The stealer itself was live for roughly thirteen hours of the day, and the whole campaign from first injection to last observed infected snippet took about seventeen hours.
How one trusted script reached 178 organisations
Optimizely Web is a website experimentation platform: customers add a single JavaScript snippet to their pages, and the snippet loads from Optimizely's content delivery network so the company can run A/B tests — showing different versions of a page to different visitors. The snippet is trusted by design: it runs with the full privileges of the site it is loaded on, it can read and change page content, and it is served over a valid TLS connection from a host the site deliberately allow-listed. The attacker wrote a short loader into the Project JavaScript field of many unrelated customers' projects — the custom code that runs on every page. The rest of each snippet was untouched. The loader added a script tag pointing at the attacker's server, 1688360.cc/track.js, and that file — roughly 30 KB, rebuilt 26 times during the day — did the damage. Because the snippet file itself still came from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's own certificate, browsers and most security allowlists treated it as legitimate. Report URI stressed that Optimizely's delivery network was not tricked into caching a fake file: the poisoned file was the file Optimizely served. That is what makes this a supply-chain attack. None of the affected companies' own servers had to be breached, because a vendor they all trusted delivered the code for them. The entry point, according to Optimizely, was a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow — but the company has not said how a flaw in a signup flow gave an outsider write access to existing customers' projects, and Report URI said it did not know whether the attacker used a compromised Optimizely system, a stolen credential with access across customers, or something else. That question is still open, and it is the most important unanswered question in the incident.
What the malware did to visitors
The payload did four things at once. First, it swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses. The clipper recognised Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses, checked that each one was valid, and replaced it with the attacker's — in page text, in form fields, in links, in the clipboard, in outgoing network requests and in the iOS share sheet. StepSecurity, which read the code independently, said the swap happened only near payment words such as 'wallet', 'deposit' or 'send'. Second, from 13:43 UTC it skimmed payment cards: it watched form submissions for a card number, expiry date and security code — the numbers were Luhn-checked, meaning the code verified they were plausible card numbers before sending them — and sent them to the attacker's server with navigator.sendBeacon to a file called card.php. Cards entered in payment boxes hosted by providers such as Stripe or Adyen were outside the script's direct reach; cards typed directly into a site's own form fields were not. Third, when it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the page address, readable cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker's server. Fourth, on iPhones and iPads it loaded iOS exploit kits: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and a fingerprinting stage on iOS 26, delivered from router domains ending in .icu. On iOS 18.6 or earlier, affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds as the exploit retried — a visible warning sign for anyone who saw it. The independent advice, repeated across the reporting, is to update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which the exploit kits' own notes describe as patched.
How much was stolen — and why the number is disputed
The one hard number in the incident is the amount that reached the attacker's wallets. By 19:25 UTC on 16 November, wallets tied to the campaign had received about $7,040 in cryptocurrency, according to Report URI — including 0.08298 bitcoin across four transactions, worth about $5,380, with the rest in other coins. At 13:03 UTC the operator swept stolen funds toward exchanges, with USDC on Ethereum landing at a HitBTC deposit address. An independent re-check of the bitcoin wallet at about 00:30 UTC on 17 November found 0.08528782 bitcoin received in five transactions, none spent. But 'received by the wallets' and 'stolen from victims' are not the same number, and later on-chain reviews put the confirmed theft lower: Galaxy Digital's Alex Thorn put it at around $2,300 across 19 fraudulent transactions, and another review put the total nearer $6,600. The gap comes from method — which transactions count as theft, which coins are included, and when the count was taken — and this page reports the range rather than choosing one figure. What cannot be counted from the outside is how many card numbers, session tokens and cookies left with the attacker, or how many iPhones were exposed to the exploit kits. The payload's own server was still answering at 00:35 UTC on 17 November: the file at 1688360.cc/track.js returned HTTP 200 with 29,882 bytes, the full payload, not a takedown page. The snippet clean-up stops new infections from Optimizely's CDN, but the attacker's infrastructure was still live when last checked. One more detail from the reporting: a TRON wallet tied to the same actor has been in use since March 2026, which suggests this was not a first job.
What Optimizely has said — and what it has not
Optimizely confirmed the incident on Tuesday 17 November 2026. Its status page carried a notice at 01:02 UTC, and the company posted on X at 01:21 UTC, saying it had identified and contained a security incident affecting some Optimizely Web Experimentation customers, that the vulnerable path was blocked, that the injected code was removed, and that customers had been contacted directly. To BleepingComputer it confirmed that an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow and used it to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. Spokesperson Victoria Johnson told Gizmodo the same. In statements carried by other outlets, the company added that it had blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected accounts, blocked delivery of the injected code at Cloudflare, and notified all affected customers. Its status page carried the incident into 17 November in monitoring state. What Optimizely has not said is as important as what it has. It has not said how a flaw in a signup flow gave an outsider write access to existing customers' projects. It has not said how many customers were affected, when the attacker first got in, or whether any customer data held by Optimizely was accessed. Its investigation is continuing, and this page will be updated when the company says more. One separate fact, reported by BleepingComputer: Optimizely had an earlier incident in February 2026, a voice-phishing attack that exposed business contact information from internal systems. No researcher has linked that incident to this one, and this page does not link them either.
Who was affected
Report URI's list of affected organisations covers 178 names, and the count is a floor, not a ceiling: the team could only check the snippets it could find in time, and the real number is probably higher. The names readers will know best, by sector: news and streaming — CNN, the BBC, Fox News, NPR, Peacock and Dungeons and Dragons Beyond; technology — Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Bitly, Smartsheet, Hootsuite and Tricentis; finance — HSBC on several regional sites, Equifax and IG; retail — IKEA, ASOS, American Eagle, Mattel, Home Chef, American Girl and Scheels; cryptocurrency — Ledger, the hardware wallet maker; travel — Air France-KLM; and Optimizely itself, whose own marketing site carried the same loader from 15:45 UTC. BleepingComputer independently confirmed the script loading, or trying to load, on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN, Smartsheet and Salesforce, using urlscan.io records. The urlscan.io service, which loads a page in a browser and records every request it makes, held 206 scans touching the attacker's domain by 21:30 UTC on Monday and 219 by 22:40 UTC. Visiting one of these sites does not mean you were robbed: what the code could take depended on what you did on the page and what device you used. Someone who only read an article was exposed to far less than someone who copied a wallet address or typed a card number into a form. The separate page on what to do if you visited an affected site sets out the checks, step by step.
What is still unknown — DEVELOPING as of Tuesday 17 November 2026
Attribution: None confirmed. No threat actor has been publicly named, and no government or agency has attributed the campaign. How the attacker got in is unknown: Optimizely has confirmed the entry point was a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow, but has not explained how that gave write access to existing customers' projects, and researchers have not settled whether it was a compromised Optimizely system, a stolen credential, or something else. How long the access lasted before it was spotted is unknown. Whether any customer data held by Optimizely was accessed is unknown. The total number of victims is unknown: the confirmed crypto total is in dispute, and the number of cards, cookies and screenshots taken cannot be counted from outside. Whether any iPhone or iPad was actually compromised by the exploit kits is unknown — no confirmed infections have been reported in the sources checked. Two further items are reported but not confirmed as part of this campaign. Report URI's timeline ties the attack to the same actor's earlier wave from 13 to 16 November, which ran through three other site-script providers — Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media — on sites including Fox Sports. That link is reported by Report URI and carried in secondary reporting; it is not confirmed by the providers or by an authority. And a TRON wallet tied to the same actor has been in use since March 2026, which points to an established operation rather than a one-off, but does not identify the actor. This page will be updated as Optimizely, Report URI, BleepingComputer or an authority publishes more, and every update will be dated.
Frequently asked questions
No — not in the sense of their own servers being breached. Malicious JavaScript reached their visitors through the Optimizely Web snippet those sites load for A/B testing. The code was injected into Optimizely customer projects and served from cdn.optimizely.com, a host every affected site already trusted. The companies' own systems were not reported breached.
The name independent researcher Amirul Cyber gave to the campaign that hit 178 organisations on 16 November 2026. The name refers to the hijacking of Optimizely snippets: the attacker's code rode inside the Optimizely Web experimentation snippet to reach visitors of sites that had nothing to do with Optimizely's own business.
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations. The list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, plus Optimizely's own sites. The real number is probably higher, because Report URI could only check the snippets it could find.
Four things: it swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's; it skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a site's own payment forms; it sent readable cookies and page screenshots to the attacker's server; and on iPhones and iPads it tried to load iOS exploit kits. Cards typed into hosted payment boxes such as Stripe or Adyen were outside its reach.
About $7,040 in cryptocurrency had reached the attacker's wallets by 19:25 UTC on 16 November 2026, according to Report URI. Later on-chain reviews put confirmed theft lower — around $2,300 across 19 transactions by Galaxy Digital's Alex Thorn, and nearer $6,600 by another review. The figure is developing, and the number of cards and cookies taken cannot be counted from outside.
The infected snippets are almost all clean: by 21:52 UTC on 16 November only one, at TalkTalk, still carried the code, and Optimizely says it removed the injected code and blocked the vulnerable path. But the attacker's payload server was still answering at 00:35 UTC on 17 November, and Optimizely's investigation is continuing. The snippet clean-up stops new infections from Optimizely's CDN.
Optimizely says an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. The company has not explained how a signup-flow flaw gave write access to existing projects, and researchers have not settled the mechanism. That is developing.
Nobody has been publicly named. No government, agency or company has attributed the campaign to any actor or country. Report URI's timeline notes a TRON wallet tied to the same actor has been in use since March 2026, and ties the attack to an earlier wave through other script providers, but the actor behind it is unknown.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 14:00 PKT.