Optimizely Hack: Was I Affected, and What Should I Do Now?
On Monday 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript reached the websites of 178 organisations through the Optimizely testing platform — CNN, the BBC, Zoom, HSBC, Ledger and more. If you visited one of those sites that day, this page tells you what to check, in order of risk: your crypto transfers first, then your card statements, then your iPhone or iPad, then your accounts. It also tells site owners what to check in their own Optimizely projects. Everything here follows the verified account on our main Optimizely page, and anything still unconfirmed is labelled developing.
In short
If you visited one of the 178 affected sites on Monday 16 November 2026, three checks matter. Check every crypto transfer you sent from Sunday night onwards, character by character, against the address you meant to use — the clipper swapped wallet addresses in the clipboard as well as on the page. Check your card statements for charges you do not recognise, if you typed a card into a site's own form from 13:43 UTC; cards entered in hosted Stripe or Adyen boxes were out of reach. And update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. Also change the passwords of accounts you used on an affected site and sign out of sessions, because the payload stole readable cookies. Site owners should check every Optimizely project's Project JavaScript for code they did not write.
First, were you actually at risk?
Visiting one of the affected sites on Monday 16 November 2026 does not, on its own, mean you were robbed. What the code could take depended on what you did on the page and what device you used. The risk falls into three groups. If you copied or pasted a cryptocurrency wallet address while an affected tab was open — even into another app — the clipper could have swapped it, because it watched the clipboard as well as the page. If you typed a card number, expiry date and security code into a site's own checkout form from 13:43 UTC onwards, the skimmer could have taken them. If you visited on an iPhone or iPad running older iOS, the page could have tried to load an exploit kit. If you only read an article, scrolled a homepage or watched a video, the code could still have taken cookies and a screenshot of the page when it swapped an address near payment wording — but it had far less to take. The checks below are ordered by risk: crypto first, then cards, then your phone, then your accounts.
Check any crypto transfer you made since Sunday night
This is the check that matters most, because crypto payments are generally irreversible: once the coins are sent to the wrong address, there is no bank to reverse them. Look at every crypto transfer you sent from Sunday night, 15 November, through Monday 16 November 2026. For each one, compare the address you actually sent to with the address you meant to use — check it character by character, not by recognising the first few characters, because the attacker's address was substituted in full. If you copied an address from a website while an affected tab was open, the clipboard itself may have been swapped, so check the address in the wallet or exchange where you pasted it, not just the page you copied it from. If an address does not match, the transfer may have gone to the attacker. Report URI's count of what reached the attacker's wallets was about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on Monday; later on-chain reviews put confirmed theft lower, so a mismatch does not automatically mean your coins are part of either total — but it does mean you should act: contact the exchange or recipient immediately, and if the funds went to an exchange deposit address, report it to that exchange's support and to the police, with the transaction hash and the time. Do not send a second payment to 'correct' the first one without checking the address again on a clean device.
Check your card statements — and your bank
The skimmer only worked on cards typed directly into a site's own payment form, from 13:43 UTC on Monday. If you paid on an affected site using a hosted payment box — the card fields provided by Stripe, Adyen or a similar processor, which load inside a frame the site itself cannot read — the script could not reach the numbers. If you typed the card into the site's own form fields, watch your statements closely for the next few weeks, and check for charges you do not recognise, including small ones: stolen cards are often tested with a small charge first. If you find a charge you do not recognise, contact your bank or card issuer and dispute it, and ask whether the card should be replaced. If you paid by card on one of the named sites on Monday and you are unsure whether the form was the site's own or a hosted box, treat it as worth checking: look at your statement, and if in doubt, ask your bank. The number of cards taken is not known, and no list of affected cardholders exists — the check is your statement, not a notification.
Update your iPhone or iPad now
On iPhones and iPads the payload loaded iOS exploit kits: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and a fingerprinting stage on iOS 26, delivered from router domains ending in .icu. The independent advice is to update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later — the exploit kits' own notes describe those versions as patched. One visible warning sign was reported for devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier: affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds as the exploit retried. If you saw a page reloading itself again and again on Monday, update your device and treat it as a reason to run the other checks on this page. No confirmed iPhone infections have been reported in the sources checked as of Tuesday 17 November 2026 — the exploit kits were delivered, but whether any device was actually compromised is unknown, and this page will say so if that changes. Updating is the single most useful step for Apple users, and it costs nothing.
Change passwords and sign out of sessions
The payload sent readable cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker's server whenever it swapped an address near payment wording. A stolen session cookie can, in principle, let someone else act as you on a site without your password. The precaution is simple and costs little: change the passwords of the accounts you used on an affected site on Monday, starting with email, banking and any account where you pay, and sign out of sessions on those accounts — most services have a 'sign out everywhere' option in their security settings. Turn on two-factor authentication where you have not already, using an authenticator app rather than SMS where the service offers the choice. This is a precaution, not a confirmed breach of any account: no list of stolen cookies has been published, and the number taken is not known. But cookies are the quietest part of this attack — there is no charge to spot on a statement and no transfer to check — so a password change and a fresh login is the way to close the door.
If you run a website that uses Optimizely
If your site loads an Optimizely Web snippet, check it today. Report URI's advice is to open every project's Project JavaScript field and every experiment's custom code and look for anything you did not write — in particular any script pointing at 1688360.cc, any use of atob( to decode hidden code, and any script tag loading from a domain you do not own. The attacker domains reported in the incident include 1688360[.]cc and the .icu router domains 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu and q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu — block them at your DNS resolver, your proxy and your Content Security Policy. Check your snippet against urlscan.io, which records what a page loads. And take the structural lesson: a third-party script runs with the full privileges of your site, so pin its version where the provider allows it, restrict it with a Content Security Policy, and audit the custom code fields of every project — not just the ones you remember editing. Optimizely says it has blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts; its status page carries the incident in monitoring state into 17 November, and its investigation is continuing.
Frequently asked questions
Not necessarily. Visiting a site was not enough on its own: the code could only take what you did on the page. If you copied a wallet address, typed a card into the site's own form, or used an older iPhone, run the checks on this page. If you only read articles, your exposure was far smaller — but check your accounts anyway if you were logged in.
Compare the address you actually sent coins to with the address you meant to use, character by character, for every transfer from Sunday night 15 November through Monday 16 November. If they do not match, the coins may have gone to the attacker. Contact the exchange or recipient immediately, with the transaction hash and time.
Watch your statements for the next few weeks, including small charges you do not recognise, and contact your bank to dispute anything unfamiliar. If you typed the card into the site's own form, consider asking your bank to replace the card. Cards entered in hosted payment boxes from Stripe or Adyen were outside the script's reach.
On iOS 18.6 or earlier, affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds as the exploit kit retried. Update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which the exploit kits' own notes describe as patched. No confirmed iPhone infections have been reported as of 17 November 2026.
Yes, for the accounts you used on an affected site on Monday — starting with email and banking — and sign out of sessions everywhere on those accounts. The payload stole readable cookies, which can act as a login without a password. Turn on two-factor authentication where it is offered.
Open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for anything you did not write, especially scripts pointing at 1688360.cc or using atob( to decode hidden code. Block the reported attacker domains at your DNS resolver, proxy and Content Security Policy, and check your pages on urlscan.io.
The infected snippets are almost all clean — by 21:52 UTC on 16 November only one, at TalkTalk, still carried the code — and Optimizely says it removed the injected code. The sites themselves were not breached. The checks on this page are for what you did on Monday, not for visiting the sites today.
Figures are given with their snapshot time and source. Developing items are marked as developing. Last checked Tuesday 17 November 2026, about 14:00 PKT.